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Long-term cultural experiences influence neural response to one’s own and friend’s faces. The present study investigated whether an individual’s
culturally specific pattern of neural activity to faces can be modulated by temporary access to other cultural frameworks using a self-construal priming
paradigm. Event-related potentials were recorded from British and Chinese adults during judgments of orientations of one’s own and friend’s faces after
they were primed with independent and interdependent self-construals. We found that an early frontal negative activity at 220–340ms (the anterior N2)
differentiated between one’s own and friend’s faces in both cultural groups. Most remarkably, for British participants, priming an interdependent
self-construal reduced the default anterior N2 to their own faces. For Chinese participants, however, priming an independent self-construal suppressed
the default anterior N2 to their friend’s faces. These findings indicate fast modulations of culturally specific neural responses induced by temporary
access to other cultural frameworks.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been much recent interest in cultural influences on neural
correlates of multiple cognitive processes, resulting in increasing
number of studies on a newly emergent field called cultural neurosci-
ence (e.g. Han and Northorff, 2008; Hedden et al., 2008; Ambady and
Bharucha, 2009; Chiao et al., 2010a; Kitayama and Tompson, 2010).
Typically, the cultural neuroscience approach contrasts the neural
responses of individuals from East Asia and those of individuals from
Western cultures on cognitive tasks. For example, when making deci-
sions whether personality trait words are descriptive of oneself or a
familiar othera typical self-referential taskWesterners (e.g. North
Americans) showed greater activation in the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) when judging the self than judging a familiar other (Craik
et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002; Lieberman et al., 2004; Heatherton,
et al., 2006). In contrast, East Asians (e.g. Chinese) showed similar
MPFC activity when judging the self and a close other (i.e. mother)
(Zhu et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2011). These findings have been attrib-
uted to the differences in value orientations between the East Asian and
Western cultures. That is, Westerners value an independent
self-construal, whereby the self is disjoint from others; East Asians,
however, value an interdependent self-construal, whereby the self in-
cludes significant others (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995).
Another approach in cultural neuroscience focuses on the effect of
temporary activation of cultural frameworks in contexts on human
brain activity. Typically, researchers first increase the temporary acces-
sibility of participants’ independent or interdependent self-construals
using priming procedures, and then observe their subsequent behav-
ioral and neural responses on some cognitive tasks (Sui and Han, 2007;
Lin et al., 2008; Chiao et al., 2010b). There has been supportive evi-
dence that cultural priming was effective in rendering the culturally
typical MPFC responses on a self-referential task (Chiao et al., 2010b;
Ng et al., 2010). Chinese-Western bicultural participants showed over-
lap of neural representations of the self and a close other in the MPFC
after Chinese cultural priming but significant differentiation between
the self and a close other in the MPFC after Western cultural priming
(Ng et al., 2010). In addition, Asian-American bicultural participants
showed increased MPFC activity when making general self-judgments
(e.g. ‘In general, I am truthful’) relative to contextual self-judgments
(e.g. ‘When talking to my mother, I am truthful’) after independent
self-construal priming, but showed increased MPFC activity during
contextual relative to general self-judgments after interdependent
self-construal priming (Chiao et al., 2010b).
Taken together, the cultural neuroscience findings indicate that
people in the Western and East Asian cultures differ in the neural
correlates of self referential processing, which can be further tempor-
arily modulated by cultural priming. However, what is missing in the
picture is how the priming of cultural orientation in the contexts may
interact with the participants’ own ‘chronic’ cultural orientation. That
is, since Westerners (East Asians) in general value independent (inter-
dependent) self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis,
1995), how would they respond when primed with an interdependent
self-construal or an independent self-construal? Would the match vs
mismatch between the primed orientation and the ‘chronic’ cultural
orientation give rise to different response patterns? This question is
important to examine because it addresses the dynamic brain re-
sponses to chronic experiences versus temporary contextual influences.
The present article aims to answer this question.
While the previous cultural neuroscience findings suggest that cul-
tural experiences affect brain functioning, cultural psychological re-
search has also shown that cultural influences on human cognition
are dynamic rather than static (Hong, 2009; Oyserman and
Sorensen, 2009). The premise is that both independent and inter-
dependent self-construals exist in all cultures (Singelis, 1994;
Oyserman et al., 2002). To the extent that Westerners habitually con-
strue their self as disjoint rather than conjoint with others, the inde-
pendent self-construal is on average more chronically accessible in the
Western participants’ mind than is the interdependent self-construal.
However, when contextual cues prime interdependent self-construals,
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hence increasing their temporary accessibility, even Westerners could
display responses that are typical of the interdependent self-construals.
The idea of priming cultural frameworks was first introduced by
Hong and her associates (Hong et al., 1997, 2000; Hong and Chiu,
2001), and was later modified to prime independent versus inter-
dependent self-construals by other researchers (Gardner et al., 1999,
Stapel and Koomen, 2001; see review by Oyserman and Lee, 2008).
Gardner et al. (1999) were among the few who have systematically
examined the interaction of participants’ chronic cultural experiences
and temporary cultural priming. In their Experiment 2, they admin-
istered independent self-construals priming, interdependent
self-construals priming or no priming (the control) on participants
from Hong Kong and the USA. Results in the control condition re-
vealed a typical cross-cultural difference, i.e. the American participants
endorsed more individualist values than collectivist values, whereas the
Hong Kong participants endorsed more collectivist values than indi-
vidualist values. Interestingly, however, the two groups showed differ-
ent patterns of responses when the priming condition match vs
mismatch their chronic cultural orientations. Specifically, when the
priming matched the participants’ chronic cultural orientation
(American being primed with independent self-construals, and Hong
Kong Chinese being primed with interdependent self-construals), the
participants did not show much difference from their respective con-
trol conditions. However, participants showed significantly different
values from their chronic cultural orientations only when the priming
condition did not match their chronic cultural orientation. These re-
sults support a culture-as-situated-cognition model that suggests that
immediately primed individual or collective ‘mind-set’ shape one’s
ongoing perception and cognition (Oyserman et al., 2009).
The present study investigated the neural correlates of the inter-
action between temporal self-construal priming and participants’
chronic cultural orientations. Provided that one would demonstrate
chronic/default cultural values in the no priming condition, we exam-
ined whether priming independent vs interdependent self-construal in
British and Chinese participants would give rise to the noted inter-
action between chronic cultural experiences and temporary cultural
priming on self-face recognition. We examined how independent/
interdependent self-construal priming affects event-related potentials
(ERPs) to images of faces of the self or a close friend relative to the no
priming condition in two cultural groups (i.e. British and Chinese). If
British on average are independent (Markus and Kitayama, 1991;
Triandis, 1995), priming the interdependent rather than independent
self-construal would produce larger changes of neural responses to self-
and friend’s faces relative to a baseline condition without self-construal
priming. Conversely, if Chinese on average are interdependent
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), priming the independ-
ent rather than interdependent self-construal may change their neural
activity to own and friend’s faces to a larger degree relative to the
baseline condition. Here, we investigated how the brain responds to
faces when self-construals are temporarily shifted by self-construal
priming that engages one’s congruent or incongruent cultural values
relative to their chronic/default cultural orientation.
Related to this, in a prior study, we used functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) to assess the effect of self-construal priming on
the neural correlates of self-recognition (Sui and Han, 2007). We had
Chinese participants carry out a face-orientation judgment task in
which they had to decide whether individual faces (of self vs friend)
were oriented to the left or right after priming independent or inter-
dependent self-construals. Participants showed faster responses to their
own faces than familiar faces after the independent self-construal prim-
ing but a reverse pattern after the interdependent self-construal prim-
ing. In addition, we found that priming Chinese participants with
independent self-construal increased right frontal activity association
with self-face recognition, which was, however, weakened by priming
their interdependent self-construal. The results indicated that dynamic
access to different self-construals within a cultural group can modulate
the neural activity of self recognition. Although this study provides the
neural evidence of dynamic accessibility of cultural value in Chinese, it
is unclear whether the effect also exists in Westerners and how early the
priming effect may occur in the brain.
Our recent ERP study showed that self-construal differences arising
from long-term cultural practice also influenced neural responses to
self-face in British and Chinese participants (Sui et al., 2009). We
assessed whether long-term cultural experiences can modulate early
components of the ERPs (e.g. the anterior N2 component) (see
Breton et al., 1988; Folstein and Petten, 2008, for a review of the N2
component). A strikingly different response occurred early-on (200ms)
and modulated the anterior N2 component when the two groups
viewed the two facial categories (own vs friend’s face). Specifically,
the British participants showed larger anterior N2 amplitude to their
own vs other faces, indicating enhanced perceptual processing for
the self over others. In contrast, the Chinese participants showed an
opposite effect (a reduced anterior N2 for own vs friend’s faces), con-
sistent with rapid suppression of self-information and enhanced
responses to the faces of close others. The data indicated differential
perceptual processing of self-faces in Western and Chinese cultures.
While our previous research focused on the effect of chronic cultural
experience on ERP response, the current work aimed to investigate
whether an individual’s culturally specific pattern of neural activity
to faces can be modulated by temporary access to other cultural con-
texts using the self-construal priming paradigm. We hypothesized that
the priming effects would be more prominent in the conditions that
mismatch the ‘chronic’ cultural tendency (i.e. British in the inter-
dependent priming condition, and Chinese in the independent prim-
ing condition) than in those that match (i.e. British in the independent
priming condition, and Chinese in the interdependent priming condi-
tion). Members of a culture that chronically encourages an independ-
ent self-construal (like the British participants) would remain
unaffected by the independent prime, but show an alternative pattern
(a reduced anterior N2 ERP amplitude to self-faces) in the inter-
dependent priming condition. Conversely, members of a culture that
chronically encourages an interdependent self-construal (like the
Chinese participants) would remain unaffected by the interdependent
prime; but show an alternative pattern (reduced N2 ERP amplitudes to
friend’s faces) in the independent priming condition.
A part of the ERP data in the no-priming condition was published in
our previous work (Sui et al., 2009). The current study recruited add-
itional participants to increase the sample size and included all the data
in the independent and interdependent conditions and in the
no-priming condition. This allowed us to investigate the interaction
between the chronic (no-priming) and temporary primed cultural
orientations (independent of interdependent priming).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty Chinese (20.6 2.2 years of age, ranged 17–27, 8 males) and 20
British (22.0 5.5 years of age, ranged 19–44, 8 males) college students
participated in this study. All participants spoke their own native lan-
guage. Informed consent was obtained prior to the experiment accord-
ing to procedures approved by a local ethic committee.
Materials
Self-construal priming
There were a no priming condition and two self-construal priming
conditions. In the no priming condition, participants read two stories
Dynamic culturalmodulation SCAN (2013) 327
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/8/3/326/1723725 by guest on 18 M
arch 2020
about the countryside that did not contain the independent or inter-
dependent pronouns. Participants were asked to circle two nouns (e.g.
park and area) in each story. In the independent or interdependent
self-construal priming condition, participants were asked to read two
stories that were adopted from Sui and Han (2007) (written in Chinese
for the Chinese participants and English for the British participants).
Each story was about 300–350 words long and described a trip to the
countryside. Independent-priming stories used first-person singular
pronouns (e.g. ‘I’, ‘mine’). Interdependent-priming stories used
first-person plural pronouns (e.g. ‘we’, ‘ours’). The participants were
asked to circle all the pronouns in the story. The types of priming
stories were counterbalanced across participants.
Face images
We took 10 digital photos of the face of each participant and 10 digital
photos of the face of a same gender friend of each participant, whom
the participant had known for 2–6 years. The face images with normal-
ized to 100 100 pixels showed 5 left and 5 right profiles of each face
and subtended 3.1 3.18 of visual angle at a viewing distance of 90 cm,
with the face angle ranging from 158 to 908 profile in each direction
with equal steps in between. All faces were shown in gray scale with a
neutral facial expression. The means of the luminance and contrast of
self and friend’s face were first calculated for each participant. Then the
luminance and contrast of each image were adjusted to the mean so
that they were the same in the self and friend face conditions. The face
stimuli were presented on a black background of a 21-inch monitor.
Procedures
The priming procedure asked participants to read a story three times
(i.e. first, read a story without circling pronouns or nouns; second,
read and circle, finally read and check). Participants’ performances on
circling the pronouns or nouns were 100% correct. After reading each
story, participants performed two blocks of a face-orientation decision
task. Each block consisted of 60 images of self face and 60 images of
friend’s face that were displayed in a random order. A block began with
the presentation of a white cross at the central of a screen for 1000ms.
A face image was then presented at the center of the screen with a
duration of 200ms, which was followed by a fixation point with a
duration varied between 800 and 1200ms. The task was to identify
the orientation of faces by pressing the left or the right buttons on a
response pad using the left or right index finger. Participants were in-
structed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. In half of
the blocks, participants were asked to respond to their own face (target)
while ignoring the friend’s face (non-target). In these blocks, we were
able to measure participants’ ERPs to the friend’s face without being
contaminated by response preparation and execution. Likewise, in the
remaining half of the blocks, participants responded to the friend’s face
(target) while ignoring their own face (non-target). In these blocks,
we were able to measure uncontaminated ERPs to one’s own face.
The experiment totally consisted of twelve blocks, four in each
priming condition. Participants responded to their own face in two
blocks and to a friend’s face in another two blocks after each type of
priming. The order of priming (independent, interdependent, and no
priming) was counterbalanced across participants. The order of tasks
(responses to self or friend’s faces) was counterbalanced within
participants.
Electrophysiological data recording and analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 62 Ag/AgCl scalp
electrodes on an elastic cap according to the extended 10–20 systems
using a right mastoid as a reference (see Sui et al., 2009). The Chinese
data were collected using a Neuroscan system in Beijing, China, and
the British data were collected using a BP system in Hull, UK. Grand
averages were calculated after re-referencing individual ERPs to the
common average reference. The EEG was amplified by a band pass
of 0.1–100Hz and digitized at a sampling rate of 250Hz. The eye blink
artifacts were monitored with electrodes located up and below the left
eye. The horizontal electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from elec-
trodes placed about 1.5 cm lateral to the left and right external canthi.
The ERPs in each condition were averaged separately off-line with
averaging epochs beginning 200ms before stimulus onset and continu-
ing for 800ms. After filtering of the EEG with a 1–30Hz bandpass
filter, trials contaminated by eye blinks, eye movements, or muscle
potentials exceeding  60 mv at any electrode were excluded from
the average. The baseline for ERP measurements was the mean voltage
of a 200ms pre-stimulus interval and the latency was measured relative
to the stimulus onset.
Separate averaging was performed for self and friend’s faces as func-
tion of priming (independent, interdependent or no priming) and
response (target vs non-target) conditions. Only correct response
trials were averaged. The amplitudes of the N170, vertex positive po-
tential (VPP) and the posterior P3 for self and friend’s faces did not
differ across the priming conditions and thus were not reported. The
mean ERP amplitudes of the anterior N2 component around
220–340ms were analyzed at the frontal (Fz, F1-F4), front-central
(FCz, FC1-FC4) and central (Cz, C1–C4) electrodes. This time
window was chosen in order to cover the priming effect on the N2
observed in both cultural groups. We predicted a culture and prime
interaction on the anterior N2 component. Since no significant differ-
ences were found between these electrode sites and between the two
hemispheres for the anterior N2 component, we only report the most
significant anterior N2 effect at Fz.
We conducted 3 2 2 2 repeated-measures analyses of variance
(ANOVA) of the mean amplitudes of the N2 component with Priming
(independent, interdependent or no priming) Face (self vs
friend)Response (target vs non-target) as within-subjects variables
and Cultural group (British vs Chinese) as a between-subjects variable.
In particular, the analysis including a no priming condition as a base-
line can maximally reduce cross-site variance in two cultural groups.
This also allowed to examine how priming modulate the neural re-
sponses to self-faces (and friend’s faces) relative to the no priming
condition. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction to the degrees of freedom
was used where applicable. Behavioral data were subjected to ANOVAs
with Priming (independent, interdependent or no priming) Face
(self vs friend) as within-subject variables and Cultural Group
(British vs Chinese) as a between-subjects variable.
RESULTS
Behavioral performance
The mean reaction times (RTs) and accuracy is showed in Table 1. The
ANOVA of RTs showed a significant main effect of Face,
F(1, 38)¼ 85.26, P< 0.001, participants responded faster to their
own-face than to a friend’s face, suggesting a self-face advantage.
There was also a significant main effect of Priming, F(2, 76)¼ 29.11,
P< 0.001, suggesting faster responses in the no priming condition than
in the independent and interdependent priming conditions
(P’s< 0.001). However, there was no significance difference in RTs
between the independent and interdependent priming conditions
(P¼ 0.95). These main effects were qualified by a significant inter-
action of Cultural Group FacePriming, F(2, 76)¼ 119.76,
P< 0.001. We further conducted AVOVAs of Cultural Group Face
in the three priming conditions, respectively. There was a significant
interaction of Cultural Group Face in the no priming condition,
F(1, 38)¼ 149.94, P<0.001, reflecting larger self-face advantage effect
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in British participants [t(19)¼16.77, P<0.0001] than in Chinese
participants [t(19)¼3.45, P< 0.005]. There was a significant main
effect of Face after the independent priming, F(1, 38)¼ 16.23 P<0.001,
but not after the interdependent priming, F(1, 38)¼ 3.62, P¼ 0.07.
RTs to participants’ own face were shorter than to a friend’s face
after the independent priming, whereas RTs did not differ between
self-face and a friend’s face after the interdependent priming (Table 1).
To assess the priming effects relative to the no priming condition in
each cultural group, ANOVAs with FacePriming in each cultural
group were then conducted. British participants showed a significant
interaction of FacePriming, F(2, 38)¼ 205.47, P< 0.001, due to
faster responses to own faces than to friends’ faces in the no priming
and independent priming conditions, t(19)¼16.77 and 2.81,
P<0.0001 and 0.02, but no such effect in the interdependent priming
condition, t(19)¼0.44, P¼ 0.67. Chinese participants only showed a
significant main effect of Face, F(1, 19)¼ 12.94 P<0.005, indicating
faster responses to own than friend’s faces across the no, independent
and interdependent priming conditions, t(19)¼3.45, 2.94 and
2.28, P< 0.005, 0.01 and 0.05, respectively. The RT results of
British participants are consistent with the idea that priming their
interdependent self-construals reduced the self-face advantage.
Analysis of the accuracy data did not show any significant effects,
P’s > 0.10.
Priming effect on the anterior N2 component
The ANOVAs of the mean N2 amplitudes at 220–340ms revealed a
reliable significant Cultural groupPriming Face interaction, F(2,
76)¼ 7.65, P¼ 0.001. Since there were no significant effects involving
Response, we collapsed the ERPs across the target and non-target re-
spond conditions. ANOVAs with two within-subjects variables (i.e.
Priming and Face) were then conducted for each cultural group to
avoid the cross-site ERP variance. The ANOVA of the N2 amplitudes
in Chinese participants showed a significant interaction of
Priming Face, F(2, 38)¼ 4.15, p< .03 (Figure 1). Separate analyses
revealed that relative to the no priming condition (M¼2.74 mV), the
independent priming decreased the neural responses to friend’s faces
[M¼2.32 mV, t(19)¼ 3.22, P¼ 0.005], but the interdependent prim-
ing did not influence the default N2 amplitudes to friend’s face
[M¼2.53 mV, t(19)¼ 1.46, P¼ 0.16]. Contrast to the friend condi-
tion, neither independent (M¼2.16 mV) nor interdependent
(M¼2.29 mV) priming affected the neural activity to self-faces rela-
tive to the no priming condition (M¼2.23 mV), t(19)¼ 0.61 and
0.54, P’s > 0.55. In order to assess the N2 difference between the self
and friend faces, paired t-tests in each priming condition were con-
ducted. Friend’s face elicited larger N2 amplitudes than self-faces in
both the no priming and interdependent priming conditions,
t(19)¼4.06 and 2.17, P<0.001 and 0.05, respectively, but no
such difference observed in the independent priming condition,
P¼ 0.16.
For British participants, ANOVAs of the N2 amplitudes also showed
a significant interaction of Priming Face, F(2, 38)¼ 3.55, P<0.05
(Figure 2). Separate analyses revealed that the interdependent priming
(M¼2.24 mV) decreased the N2 amplitude of self faces compared to
the no priming condition [M¼2.80 mV, t(19)¼ 2.35, P<0.03], but
the independent priming (M¼2.89 mV) did not affect the neural
response to one own faces relative to the no priming condition
[M¼2.80 mV, t(19)¼0.28, P¼ 0.79]. On the other hand, priming
(independent and interdependent: M¼2.89 and 2.19 mV) did not
modulate the N2 amplitudes to friend’s faces relative to the no priming
condition (M¼2.41 mV), t(19)¼1.58 and 1.39, P’s > 0.13. Paired
t-tests between the self and friend’s faces further showed that, in the no
priming condition, the N2 amplitudes were larger to one’s own faces
than to friends faces, t(19)¼ 2.25, P<0.05, but no such difference was
observed in the independent and interdependent priming conditions,
P’s > 0.60.
To summarize, consistent with our prediction, for British partici-
pants, priming the interdependent self-construal reduced the default
anterior N2 to their own faces in the no priming condition. For
Chinese participants, priming the independent self-construal sup-
pressed the default anterior N2 to their friend’s faces in the no priming
condition. Thus, when the priming condition mismatched with the
chronic cultural orientation of the two groups, the culturally typical
anterior N2 effect was eliminated. However, the priming that matches
the chronic orientation of a cultural group did not influence the typical
culture-specific pattern on the anterior N2 responses relative to the no
priming condition.
DISCUSSION
The present results confirm that there are cultural difference in ERPs
elicited by one’s own and a friend’s faces (the anterior N2; see also Sui
et al., 2009). However, the findings of the current work go beyond this
by showing that the early culturally sensitive neural activity to self-face
and a friend’s faces was affected by contextual independent vs inter-
dependent self-construal priming. Moreover, the effects of
self-construal priming were most prominent when the priming condi-
tion did not match the chronic cultural orientation for both the British
and Chinese participants, despite that the two cultural groups demon-
strated opposite default neural responses to self- and other-faces.
To elaborate, the participants’ default neural responses to self-face
were significantly modulated by the priming that is incongruent with
their chronic orientation, presumably due to temporarily increased
accessibility of a contrasting cultural framework. For Chinese partici-
pants, whose default self-construal is interdependent (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), priming an independent
self-construal (the ‘I’ context) eliminated the default anterior N2 com-
ponent to a friend face. For British individuals, whose default
self-construal is independent (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis,
1995), priming an interdependent self-construal (the ‘We’ context)
abolished the default anterior N2 response to their own face. These
findings suggest that the culturally-specific neural response to self-face
and a friend’s face can be modulated by the ongoing contexts that may
shift one’s self-construal away from his/her default orientation, which
are consistent with the findings in cultural psychology (Gardner et al.,
1999). Although prior research has shown that self priority in the
neural processing of traits or faces can be altered dynamically by
self-construal priming (Sui & Han, 2007; Ng et al., 2010; Chiao
et al., 2010b), the current study provide the first evidence that the
modulation of neural responses to self-face and familiar faces by
dynamic contexts can emerge as early as 220ms after sensory
Table 1 Mean RTs and accuracy (s.d. in brackets) as a function of Cultural group, Priming
and Face
RTs (ms) Accuracy (%)
Self-construal priming Face British Chinese British Chinese
Independent Self 516 (58) 479 (92) 95.5 (4.3) 97.7 (2.6)
Friend 530 (67) 491 (94) 96.1 (2.9) 97.3 (3.4)
Interdependent Self 524 (55) 475 (79) 96.7 (2.8) 97.8 (1.9)
Friend 527 (61) 489 (91) 95.7 (3.1) 97.0 (4.1)
No-priming Self 401 (44) 477 (89) 96.2 (3.3) 98.1 (1.8)
Friend 523 (59) 493 (96) 95.3 (3.6) 97.4 (2.3)
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stimulation and the effect of self-construal priming was observed re-
gardless of one’s default self-construals.
Our ERP results showed that the priming that activates the
self-construal that is congruent with one’s own cultural orientation
did not change neural responses to self and friend’s faces in compari-
son to the no priming condition. Chinese participants generated com-
parable N2 responses to a friend’s faces in the interdependent and no
priming conditions, and for British participants priming the independ-
ent self-construal did not alter their default neural responses to self
faces in the no priming condition. The results provide the neural evi-
dence for the findings in cultural psychology that when the priming
congruent with participants’ chronic cultural orientation, the partici-
pants did not show difference from the no priming condition (Gardner
et al., 1999).
Fig. 2 Priming effects of the anterior N2 elicited by self- and friend’s faces at Fz in British participants (collapsed across the target and non-target respond conditions). After priming interdependent
self-construal, the anterior N2 amplitudes to own-faces were decreased relative to the no priming condition but no such effect observed after priming the independent self-construal (A). Priming did not
modulate the N2 amplitudes to a friend’s face compared to the no priming condition (B). Top views of voltage topographies of the anterior N2 to self-face at all electrode positions are shown in (C) and those of
friend’s faces in (D).
Fig. 1 Priming effects of the anterior N2 elicited by self- and friend’s faces at Fz in Chinese participants (collapsed across the target and non-target respond conditions). Priming the independent/interdependent
self-construal did not modulate the anterior N2 amplitudes to own-faces relative to the no priming condition (A). Priming the independent self-construal reduced the default N2 amplitudes to a friend’s faces in
the no priming conditions, but no such effect observed after priming the interdependent self-construal (B). Top views of voltage topographies of the anterior N2 to self-face at all electrode positions are shown
in (C) and those of friend’s faces in (D).
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It is well known that the anterior N2 component is highly sensitive
to detecting changes of physical features of stimuli from perceptual
templates, which are based on both long-term and short-term experi-
ence with visual objects (Breton et al., 1988; Folstein and Petten, 2008).
The present results revealed that the anterior N2 component is also
sensitive to detecting changes of social salience of stimuli (one’s own
face vs the faces of familiar others). Our prior work has showed that
the anterior N2 component responded to the changes of social salience
of stimuli established by long-term exposure to a specific culture (Sui
et al., 2009). For British participants the anterior N2 component is
sensitive to detecting images of one’s own face, whereas for Chinese it
is sensitive to those of both one’s own face and a friend’s face. Beyond
this, the present study demonstrates that the neural processing of social
salience of a stimulus is modulated by temporary accessibility of the
independent or interdependent self-construal. These findings provide
the ERP evidence for a culture-as-situated-cognition mode proposed
in cultural psychology, which stresses the role of online cultural con-
text in perception and cognition (Oyserman et al., 2009).
A plausible interpretation of the priming effects observed in the
study is that the priming effect may reflect short experiences primed
by an immediate context rather than long-term established experi-
ences. If it is true, we would observe consistent patterns of brain ac-
tivity after priming the independent (or interdependent) self-construal
across British and Chinese participants. However, the results showed
that priming the interdependent rather than independent self-
construal altered British participants’ neural responses to self-faces,
whereas priming the independent rather than interdependent
self-construal changed Chinese participants’ N2 responses to a friend’s
face. The data clearly demonstrated different priming effects between
British and Chinese participants, and priming effect in the direction
can be predicted by the default cultural orientations of Western and
East Asian societies. These results indicated the joint role of chronic
cultural orientations and online cultural contexts on face processing.
In sum, our ERP results indicate that, besides long-term cultural
influence on the neuro-cognitive processes of self-face and a friend’s
face, temporarily priming independent or interdependent self-
construal also modulates the neural responses to self-face and a friend’s
face. People can be shifted away from their default state of culturally
specific neural process of self-face and a friend’s face, suggesting the
dynamic interactive influences of temporal accessibility of cultural
value and chronic accessibility of cultural orientations on neural sub-
strates. These fast-acting influences (from 220ms stimulus onset) can
give rise to flexible responding across different contexts and to estab-
lishing common ground in communication between individuals from
different cultural backgrounds.
The previous neuroscience studies have shown evidence that the
functional organization of the brain regions involved in both sensory
(e.g. the occipital cortex, Gougoux et al., 2009) and social (e.g. the
medial prefrontal cortex, Ma and Han, 2011) processing changes as a
function of sensory experiences. Together with the contemporary cul-
tural neuroscience studies, the current work showed evidence that the
brain activity involved in cognitions also change as a function of cul-
tural experiences. The cultural neuroscience findings extend the pre-
vious neuroscience studies by showing that both sensory and cultural
experiences shape the brain activity. However, neural plasticity related
to sensory and cultural experiences may play important roles in sen-
sory processing and social cognition, respectively. The cultural neuro-
science findings also raise important questions regarding neural
plasticity. If people can show drastically different neural responses in
response to priming of a contrastive cultural orientation, would it be
possible to overwrite participants’ ‘chronic’ cultural tendency given
repeated priming of the contrastive cultural orientation? This is in
fact the case encountered by migrants or sojourners to a new culture.
Would substantial acculturation in a foreign culture be enough to alter
the default neural responses from one’s native culture? Even more
intriguing, how would the brain change in response to the accultur-
ation process? These questions deserve future investigation.
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